Animal social learning is typically studied experimentally by the presentation of artificial foraging tasks. Although productive, results are often variable even for the same species. We present and test the hypothesis that one cause of variation is that spatial distance between rewards and the means of reward release causes conflicts for participants' attentional focus. We investigated whether spatial contiguity between a visible reward and the means of release would affect behavioral responses that evidence social learning, testing 21 brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), a much-studied species with variant evidence for social learning, and one hundred eighty 2-to 4-year-old human children (Homo sapiens), a benchmark species known for a strong social learning disposition. Participants were presented with a novel transparent apparatus where a reward was either proximal or distal to a demonstrated means of releasing it. A distal reward location decreased attention toward the location of the demonstration and impaired subsequent success in gaining rewards. Generally, the capuchins produced the alternative method to that demonstrated, whereas children copied the method demonstrated, although a distal reward location reduced copying in younger children. We conclude that some design features in common social learning tasks may significantly degrade the evidence for social learning. We have demonstrated this for 2 different primates but suggest that it is a significant factor to control for in social learning research across all taxa.
The formation of social traditions and culture in animal societies relies on the social transmission of information among individuals in a group. Many cognitive mechanisms exist that might facilitate the transmission of information from one individual to another (Heyes, 1994; Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004) , and understanding these mechanisms is integral to understanding species differences in cultural abilities. Whiten et al.'s (2004) taxonomy of social learning mechanisms in primates details a plethora of ways in which social learning might occur with different mechanisms involving differing levels of cognitive complexity. For example, Whiten et al. (2004) define imitation as copying the form of an action (model movement centered), object movement reenactment as copying the form of a caused object movement (object movement centered), and end-state-emulation as copying only the end or outcome of an action sequence (outcome centered). Refinements in empirical methods and experimental tasks have aided the identification of social learning and the corresponding mechanisms. One key experimental tool is artificial foraging apparatuses, with two-action apparatuses offering a powerful design for measuring social learning. First implemented by Dawson and Foss (1965) with budgerigars, these apparatuses offer two or more means of accessing a reward (henceforth shortened to means) held within a defense component that may occur in natural foods such as shelled fruits and insects within nests. Control subjects are given such a task without any social information. Their behavior serves as a baseline and is compared with other individuals' behavior following observation of either of the alternative approaches. Social learning can be evidenced by increased levels of success, decreased latency to success, or matching the means demonstrated.
In the last decade, such apparatuses have been used in taxa from birds (Aplin et al., 2015) to meerkats (Thornton & Malapert, 2009) ; primate species including chimpanzees (Whiten, Horner, & de Waal, 2005) , squirrel monkeys (Claidière, Messer, Hoppitt, & Whiten, 2013) , and vervet monkeys (van de Waal, Renevey, Favre, & Bshary, 2010) ; as well as human children (Horner & Whiten, 2005) and adults (Flynn & Smith, 2012) . However, within-and cross-species comparisons of social learning can be elusive because of variation in the different apparatuses' manifestations, which can vary in their (a) means, (b) degree of transparency, (c) model type, and (d) efficiency (see Figure 1 for an illustration of these differences). Thus, identifying the copying of a model's movement ("imitation"; Whiten & Ham, 1992) may be restricted to tasks where the same component is moved but by different model actions (Figure 1[1c] ), or through the use of a ghost condition ( Figure 1[3b] e.g., Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2008) . Given the theoretical assertion that mechanisms such as imitation may be unique to humans (Tomasello, 1996) , it is important that the social learning capabilities of each species are correctly identified.
For some species, the evidence for social learning capabilities is still extremely variable. For example, capuchins (Cebus and Sapajus genus) belonging to the Cebidae family display strong social bonds, tool-use in the wild, and evidence of complex social traditions (Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004; Perry, 2011; Perry et al., 2003) , and yet huge variation exists in experimental evidence for social learning in this genus (e.g., Dindo, Thierry, de Waal, & Whiten, 2010 vs. Fragaszy & Visalberghi, 1989 ). Here we explore the hypothesis that some of these differences have been caused by variations in the apparatuses presented, specifically regarding the spatial contiguity of the reward, the means, and the consequent social information as it affects the means. Capuchins' natural attentional disposition may direct them toward rewards,
Differences
Detail Example Description
(1) means of accessing reward (a) different access points
One of two defenses is disabled (e.g., open door A versus door B).
(b) same access but different components moved
The same defense is removed in one of two ways (e.g., door opens up versus door slides).
(c) same component moved but different model actions
The model uses one of two methods to achieve the same movement (e.g., push using index finger versus pull using index and thumb).
(2) degree of transparency
(a) opacity in apparatus
The reward is not visible and potentially neither is some or all of the means of accessing reward.
(b) transparency in apparatus
The reward is visible and potentially so are critical means of accessing reward.
(3) model (a) animate The means of accessing reward is visibly achieved by an animate agent usually a conspecific or a human model.
(b) mechanical
The means of accessing reward is achieved 'as if by a ghost' using invisible mechanisms (ghost condition).
(4) efficiency (a) efficient The means of accessing reward is achieved in an efficient way.
(b) inefficient The means of accessing reward is achieved in an inefficient way; some actions may be unnecessary to cause means. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
making them less attentive to important social information distal to these rewards. In the wild, capuchins may be attracted to, for example, a nut protected by an opaque defense (the shell). These elements, the nut and the shell, are directly proximal to each other. If a conspecific demonstrated breaking the defense and acquiring the nut, for example by hitting the shell with a stone hammer, the model's actions and the means (shell breaking) are also proximal. In contrast, the form of some apparatuses is such that the reward is visible (the apparatus is transparent) and the means is not immediately proximal to the reward (Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 1999; Fragaszy & Visalberghi, 1989; Visalberghi, 1993) . Accordingly, attention may be drawn to the reward rather than to the social information, potentially impairing social learning. Spatial contiguity has been long thought of as a factor affecting nonsocial associative learning in animals. Proximal unconditioned stimuli (often a food reward) and conditioned stimuli (akin to the means) aid conditioning and discrimination learning (Wasserman & Miller, 1997) . Rhesus macaques, for example, fail to learn a series of pattern discrimination problems when required to make their instrumental response at a distal location from the stimulus but are successful when the two are proximal (Polidora & Fletcher, 1964) . Similarly, 2-year-old and young 3-year-old human children struggle to understand a causal relationship between an action and an outcome when the two are distal, but succeed when the two are proximal (Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007) . It is interesting that 3-and 4-year-old children were successful in both conditions, suggesting a developmental shift in the understanding of a causal event distally located from an action.
Another factor that might decrease success in tasks that have a distal spatial contiguity between means and rewards is prepotent responses to attend to and reach for food, associated with a lack of inhibitory control. Capuchins, described as an impulsive species (Fragaszy et al., 2004) , have relatively poor inhibitory control compared with other large-brained primates (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008) . Task-naïve capuchins show little evidence of selfcontrol concerned with delay gratification (Beran et al., 2016) , although with training they can develop delay gratification and let lesser rewards pass them by to obtain greater rewards (Bramlett, Perdue, Evans, & Beran, 2012) . Furthermore, capuchins can also learn to use a computer joystick where their actions (operating the joystick) are necessarily spatially distal from the movement of the cursor (Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel, 2008) . Therefore, we might expect to see an improvement in performance over multiple trials and phases when using distally presented rewards.
Taking such considerations into account in the context of social learning, we may predict more learning in capuchins when the distance between reward and the action upon the defense are proximal or unknown. Conversely, we would predict depleted evidence of social learning when the reward and action upon the defense are visibly distal. Dindo, Thierry, de Waal, and Whiten (2010) created an opaque apparatus in which either one food reward was baited behind a central door-defense that could be removed up, either diagonally left or right (Experiment 1), or two food rewards each baited behind two defenses that could be accessed by moving a slider up either diagonally left or right (Experiment 2). Copying of the means (door left or right) was evident in Experiment 1 but relatively diminished in Experiment 2. The authors concluded that the different responses may have been because of the capuchins prioritizing exploratory behavior when alternative foraging locations were accessible. An alternative explanation is that the reward locations affected the capuchins' attention: in Experiment 1 attention was directed toward the reward behind the central door and this door's movement was salient, whereas in Experiment 2 attention was directed toward the rewards behind the two top defenses and the central door movement was less salient. Thus, opacity of reward location may facilitate social learning.
There are empirical examples of opaque defense configurations, such that the distance between the reward and actions upon the defense are also opaque. Crast, Hardy, and Fragaszy (2010) created a task for tufted capuchins (Sapajus apella) involving opaque juice dispensers offering two different methods of solution. Here, infants' learning was assisted by the demonstration of successful juice extraction by adults. There was some evidence of preferential copying of the specific method seeded although this was confounded by the locking of the alternative method during a phase of the experiment. Dindo, Thierry, and Whiten (2008) and Fredman and Whiten (2008) created a number of opaque apparatuses that included a single defense that could be operated in either of two different ways and in both studies there was significant matching to the method witnessed, possibly by emulation of the means (e.g., lift door vs. slide door). Fredman and Whiten (2008) included a study where humans demonstrated a tool-use behavior to humanreared capuchins. Here, some evidence existed that capuchins copied the model's actions as well as the result. Fredman and Whiten (2008) suggest that the enculturation experience of these capuchins may have elevated cognitive processes to facilitate imitation or other relatively sophisticated social learning mechanisms. However, differences in demonstration from humans versus conspecifics cannot be discounted as explanations for the differences in learning between the human-raised and mother-raised capuchins.
In contrast to such opaque apparatuses, some studies have employed transparent tasks with a distal location between reward and actions upon the defense and these have elicited very little evidence of social learning. Fragaszy and Visalberghi (1989) presented two different apparatuses to two groups of tufted capuchins. Both apparatuses had visible rewards and required the use of tools. Several capuchins in each group learned to solve these problems, but the analysis of conspecific observations and order of success did not provide any evidence of the capuchins learning about specific instrumental relations. Likewise, Visalberghi (1993) presented six capuchin monkeys with sticks and a transparent, baited tube. Three spontaneously solved the task but the other three, despite opportunity to watch successful conspecifics, were not successful. Analysis of videos revealed that the capuchins did not selectively scrutinize the actions of the model while s/he solved the problem any more than in nondemonstration periods. It should be noted that these tasks also required tool use which may have impacted success. Custance et al. (1999) employed two versions of a transparent apparatus, incorporating either a barrel or bolt latch, each of which could be opened with either of two techniques consisting of two related actions. The reward was visible at the bottom of the apparatus although it was not placed in a specific area (T. Fredman, personal communication, June 8, 2016 ) and the defenses were situated at the top section of the apparatus. In the bolt latch task, the capuchins used the demonstrated technique and the nonThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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demonstrated technique at equivalent frequencies, and coders were unable to infer which technique the capuchins had seen demonstrated. Likewise, the two techniques for the bolt latch were used at equivalent frequencies irrespective of demonstration content, although here coders were able to infer which technique had been demonstrated based on whether the capuchin's actions occurred in the front or the back of the apparatus. In summary, capuchin social learning has appeared most evident and sophisticated when the distance between reward and means were proximal or unknown. These findings support the hypothesis that visible contiguity between reward and social information affects social learning. The current study directly tested this hypothesis by systematically manipulating the proximity between a reward and the social information. We predicted that the location of the reward would affect capuchin performance on the task such that a reward that was distal, as opposed to proximal to the task, would (a) reduce attention toward the means as the capuchins would look significantly more at the reward, (b) reduce success and latency to success, and (c) reduce copying of demonstrated means.
A Comparative Study With Human Children
We have focused the previous analysis and the present study on capuchin monkeys because our general hypothesis may explain the huge variability in evidence for social learning in this genus. However, as previously discussed, effects of spatial continuity on learning are evident in other animals. Here we chose to explore the issue further with a second primate species, humans. Human children are prolific social learners from infancy (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998) , and the importance of attention for children's social learning has long been highlighted (Bandura & Walters, 1977) . Children can provide a good comparative group for understanding phenomena relating to social learning because unlike many captive primate populations, one can access a large sample size allowing for (a) additional experimental conditions; (b) the study of a large sample, within a restricted age period, to capture developmental changes in the phenomena of interest; and (c) the inclusion of additional control conditions excluding the demonstration of social information. The current study involved one hundred eighty 2-to 4-yearold children alongside 21 capuchins.
In the last two decades, there has been a surge of experiments with children utilizing 'foraging' apparatuses, with stickers often replacing food rewards (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Wood et al., 2016) . These apparatuses have evidenced sophisticated social learning in children that extends to high fidelity copying of demonstrator actions and results (Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010) . For the current study, 2-to 4-year-olds were selected because there are important developmental changes in social learning mechanisms during these ages. For example, following video demonstrations of the removal of a reward, situated 15 cm behind an opaque defense, 5-year-old children faithfully copied all actions, whereas 3-year-olds omitted significantly more of the unnecessary actions (McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007) . Exploring the effect of spatial contiguity in a similar apparatus should inform our understanding of the impact of distracting rewards upon social learning.
Development of children's cognitive skills may affect their attention to reward, rather than means. For example, 4-year-olds show substantially more settled and focused attention than do 2-year-olds (Anderson & Levin, 1976; Ruff & Capozzoli, 2003) . They can therefore focus on multiple stimuli and be less distracted by other attractive stimuli. Ruff and Capozzoli (2003) suggest inhibitory control processes were present in the older, but not the younger, children. Indeed, there is a significant increase in children's inhibitory control abilities from 2 to 4 years old (Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996) . We tested 60 children on their response to the apparatus without showing them social information to ascertain a baseline of success (we also did this for two male capuchins that would not isolate). Half of the control children were presented with the task with the reward and means distally located, half with them proximally located. We predicted less success and greater latency to success for children in the distal as opposed to the proximal condition. For the 120 children that watched demonstrations we predicted that, as with the capuchins, a reward that was distal, as opposed to proximal, to the means would (a) reduce attention toward the means as the children would look significantly more at the reward, (b) reduce success and latency to success, and (c) reduce copying of the demonstrated means. Furthermore, in line with improvement in attention and inhibitory control, we predicted that this effect would be least pronounced in the older children.
Experiment 1: Capuchins Study Site and Participants
Participants were housed at the Living Links to Human Evolution Research Centre, based within the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland's Edinburgh Zoo, United Kingdom (Leonardi, Buchanan-Smith, Dufour, MacDonald, & Whiten, 2010; Macdonald & Whiten, 2011) . Accordingly, all procedures were approved by the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland as well as the Ethics Committee of the University of St Andrews' School of Psychology. Procedures were conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Association for the Study of Animal Behavior. The Centre houses two mixed species communities of common squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and brown (tufted) capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) in two neighboring enclosures. At the time of the experiment, there were nine adult males, seven adult females, seven subadults, six juveniles, and six infants. The groups were housed in similar enclosures comprised of a 900 m 2 outdoor area containing vegetation and a 189 m 3 indoor enclosure. The monkeys have 24-hr indoor and outdoor access (excepting inclement weather), including access to an off-exhibit indoor area. The monkeys are given a rich diet of meat, eggs, fruit, vegetables, and TrioMunch pellets and have access to water ad libitum except for periods of voluntary isolation in the research cubicles, which involve a maximum of two 15-min periods on 4 days of the week.
Most of the monkeys are habituated to remain in the research cubicles for research sessions by themselves. Entrance into the research cubicles is voluntary and a monkey is never forced to come into the research cubicles. If a monkey shows any signs of distress, including ceasing participation, moving to the back of the cubicle, putting hands on the cubicle slides and/or specific vocalizations, they are reintroduced to the group immediately. Rewards used in experiments are sunflower seeds, nuts, raisins, dates, cereal, and mealworms. Maximum allowances for these are specified by the husbandry team. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Participants over 1 year of age (N ϭ 33) were invited into research cubicles. Of the 33 potential participants, 22 animals voluntarily separated to participate, but three of these showed signs of anxiety during the demonstration phase and so did not continue with the experiment, leaving 19 capuchins that participated in the full experiment. These capuchins ranged from 3 to 17 years old. Nine capuchins (three females, mean age ϭ 8.8 [SD ϭ 4.4] years) were in the proximal condition, and 10 capuchins (three females, mean age ϭ 6.5 [SD ϭ 3.3] years) were in the distal condition. Two additional adult males would not separate from the group but were able to monopolize the apparatus and so participated at the end. They served as no-demonstration controls, receiving no information before being given access to the task.
Design
In a between-groups design, capuchins were systematically assigned, dependent on their age and sex, to one of two experimental conditions in which the food reward was placed in either a proximal (5 cm) or distal (25 cm) location relative to the means. Capuchins watched either a pull-cord or lift-platform method of reward retrieval counterbalanced across the experimental condition. Finally, as a quasi within-subject control the reward location was reversed in a second phase creating an additional withinsubject variable of reward location.
Materials
A new apparatus was created for this experiment to meet three criteria not met in preexisting apparatus: (a) the apparatus had two distinctly different means of accessing a single reward; (b) the reward could be moved to manipulate the distance between the reward and the means; (c) the reward would always be equidistant from the two means. The apparatus (Figure 2 ) was a transparent plastic case (l ϭ 30 cm, h ϭ 10 cm, d ϭ 8 cm). Within the case, there was a transparent platform situated 4 cm from the top that ran the length of the case. The platform was hinged so the platform could swing up like a flap. The reward could be placed at either end of this platform. There were two means of acquiring the reward. The first means was pull-cord: On the right-hand-side of the platform a cord was threaded from the base of the platform to the top of the case and through a plastic knobble that sat at the top of the box. Thus, when this knobble was pulled up, the cord pulled the platform up, so the reward rolled off the back. The length of this cord prevented the platform from rotating downward. The second means was lift-platform: Below the platform was a 3 cm 2 square hole such that the platform could be pushed up from below, again making the reward roll off the back. The released reward fell to the bottom of the front of the transparent case where there was a rectangular hole (l ϭ 26 cm, h ϭ 2 cm) through which the reward exited the case. At the back of the case was a door to allow rebaiting.
Testing took place in one of eight neighboring research cubicles (each approximately 50 cm ϫ 50 cm ϫ 50 cm). At the front of each research cubicle was a window with six holes; one circular (d ϭ 3 cm) hole in the center of the window where all rewards could be given by the experimenter, and five holes corresponding with specific locations on the task when it was flush against the window. These included a rectangular formation of four round (d ϭ 3 cm) holes: hole A in line with the knobble at the top of the task, just above food reward in proximal condition; hole B in line with the opening below the platform, just below food in proximal condition; hole C same height as hole A but located 15 cm away, just above food in distal condition; hole D same height as hole B but located 15 cm away, just below food in distal condition. The final hole was rectangular with the same dimensions as the exit and lined up with this exit when the box was flush against the window. A Sony Handycam was positioned on a tripod behind the task facing toward the capuchins so that their behavior, including their responses and head and eye movements, could be videorecorded.
Procedure
Capuchins were isolated opportunistically depending on cubicle entry and willingness to isolate. Once isolated the capuchin was rewarded with a seed from each of four holes from which they could potentially access the task or attempt to access the food. The trolley with the task was pulled to within 30 cm of the front of the window so the capuchin could see the task but not touch it. Once the capuchin was attending to the front the experimenter said the capuchin's name while simultaneously holding up a reward just above the center of the task. The experimenter then baited the box, putting the reward in either a proximal or distal location. Within 2 s the experimenter operated either the pull-cord or lift-platform method, such that the platform swung up and the reward fell out of the apparatus and into a tray below, making it clear that the reward had been extracted. The capuchins received 10 demonstrations. On demonstrations one, four, seven, and 10 the nut was taken from the tray and given to the capuchin through the central reward hole. These reward intervals were selected to sustain interest and to indicate that monkeys could receive the reward. A peanut was not given after each trial to avoid satiation and exceeding the zoo's recommend daily amounts (presuming the capuchin gained all rewards in the phase). Figure 2 . The test apparatus. The reward (highlighted by a white circle) was either distal (left images) or proximal (right images) to the two means. The two means are highlighted by a black rectangle: (1) "pull-cord" (top images): a plastic knobble joined to the platform by string. Pulling knobble causes the platform to rotate up, and the reward to fall from the back of the platform to the case exit; (2) "lift-platform": a square hole in the front of the case. Inserting finger through hole and pushing platform causes platform to rotate up, and the reward to fall from the back of the platform to the case exit. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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After the 10 demonstrations, the experimenter rebaited the task in the same way and pushed the task forward until it was against the window and the session time of 5 min started. If a capuchin was successful it was given up to a further four trials within 5 min. Capuchins that were not successful were given much lower value rewards through the central hole, including a sunflower seed every minute and two nuts at the end of the session. This was to adhere to facility requirements of promoting isolation and participation in the research cubicles. There was a second phase up to 6 days later with no demonstrations. The reward was baited in the opposite end of the task for each capuchin. If the capuchin was successful it was given up to a further four trials if this fell within 5 min.
Coding
Four people (two individuals unaware of the study's aims, one person not involved in the study but aware of the broad hypothesis, and the experimenter) separately coded visual attention for each of the 10 trials at the point at which either the pull-cord or liftplatform action was performed. Coders were separately asked to imagine a line in the middle of the apparatus and judge, at the moment at which the platform was most raised and the reward fell, whether attention was toward: (a) the left side of the box, where the means were located (means); (b) at the right side of the box, away from the means (nonmeans); (c) away from the box (away); or (d) unsure of where attention was focused (unsure). If fewer than three coders agreed on a category, this was coded as unsure. All other behaviors were coded by one of the individuals unaware of the study's aims and these included: (a) the side of the box where the participant's hand first made contact with the box (First Touch: means or nonmeans); (b) successful retrieval of the reward within the trial time (Success: yes or no); (c) duration between the task being pushed flush to the cubicle window and the reward exiting the box (Latency to success); and (d) how the reward was obtained (Means: pull-string, lift-platform, or other). Table 1 summarizes the participant allocation and main findings. The following sections provide details of statistical analyses of the main hypotheses.
Results

Attention Toward Means Demonstrations
Stepwise multiple regressions were conducted to evaluate whether visual attention during demonstrations could be predicted by the reward location and the age of the capuchin (Table 2) . The count of a capuchin's attention over the 10 trials and the capuchin's age were entered separately for attention toward the means and nonmeans with age and reward location as predictor variables. For both attention toward the means and nonmeans, the model accounting for significantly more variance than no predictors included just reward location; with a distal reward location predicting a greater number of looks toward means (p Ͻ .001) and looks away from means (p Ͻ .01).
Effects of Reward Contiguity on Success
Ten capuchins used pull-cord and eight capuchins used liftplatform for their first success, indicating no bias toward either method (Binomial, p ϭ .82, all nonparametric tests are twotailed). Three of the 19 capuchins, all in the distal condition (N ϭ 10), were unsuccessful. This 30% failure rate was not significantly different from the 0% failure rate of those in the proximal condition (N ϭ 9, Fisher's exact, p ϭ .12). Latency to success was investigated with unsuccessful capuchins given a latency of 300 s (5 min). A stepwise linear regression was conducted to evaluate whether reward location and participant age were necessary to predict latency to success. 
Effects of Reward Contiguity on Matching of Demonstrated Means
Twelve of the 16 successful capuchins used the alternative means to the one demonstrated (Binomial, p ϭ .08). Eight of the nine capuchins in the proximal condition used the opposite means to the one demonstrated which was itself significant (Binomial, p Ͻ .05). Four of the seven successful capuchins in the distal condition used the opposite means to the one demonstrated which was not a significant difference (Binomial, p Ͼ .99). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and below is a brief overview of the additional analyses. Two capuchins that would not isolate had a reward baited in the proximal location with no demonstration; one discovered pull-cord in 5 s and the other Note. Attendance to demonstrations (range ϭ 0 -10) and latency to success were not normally distributed (x ϭ median). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Additional Analyses of Behavioral Details
discovered lift-platform in 2 s. Including the two no-demonstration capuchins, the first touch of 20/21 capuchins corresponded to the location of the reward (Binomial two-tail, p Ͻ .001). Participants could participate in up to five trials in 5 min; 9/9 capuchins in the proximal condition had five successes whereas only 5/10 capuchins in the distal condition completed five trials. In the second phase, when the location of the reward was reversed for each capuchin (proximal to distal and vice versa), the majority once again touched the side of the task where the reward was located, although six capuchins, originally in the proximal condition, touched the side congruent with the means. All previously successful capuchins were successful again. Two of the three previously unsuccessful capuchins were successful when the reward was moved from distal to proximal, both succeeding in 4s. The third capuchin did not interact with the task. Eight capuchins used the same method throughout; seven of these used the pull-cord. The remaining 12 capuchins used both methods.
Experiment 2: Children Study Site and Participants
In total, one hundred ninety-three 2-to 4-year-old children completed the study. Thirteen children were excluded from analysis for various reasons (English not first language, technical problems during experiment, or interference by caregiver). The remaining 180 children (90 females) ranged from 24 to 59 months (M ϭ 41.4, SD ϭ 10.3). Children were recruited while visiting Edinburgh Zoo through a poster which read, "Aged 2 to 4? Win stickers!" Consent was obtained from the child's caregiver, provided they were a parent or grandparent.
Design
In a between-groups design echoing the capuchin study, children were systematically assigned, dependent on their age and sex, to one of two experimental conditions, with the reward being placed in a proximal (5 cm) or distal (25 cm) location relative to the means. Following the procedure of Experiment 1, 120 of these children watched 10 demonstrations of either the pull-cord or lift-platform method or reward retrieval. An additional 60 children did not see any demonstration.
Materials
The same apparatus was used, bolted to a small wooden table (l ϭ 50 cm, h ϭ 40 cm, d ϭ 40 cm). The reward within the apparatus was a plastic medal (d ϭ 3 cm) which was then exchanged for an equal sized sticker. Testing took place in a designated child research room at RZSS Edinburgh Zoo. There were two small chairs (h ϭ 80 cm) in the room; one in front of the task (for the participant), and one by the entrance to the room (for the caregiver). The camera and tripod were adjusted for the height of the child.
Procedure
After obtaining written consent from the caregiver and verbal consent from the child, the child and caregiver were invited into the research room. Additional members of the child's visiting group were asked to remain outside. Children were asked to take a seat on the chair in front of the task, and the experimenter knelt to be at a similar height to the child. The table with the task was Note. Proximal condition includes two monkeys with no demonstration. Attendance to demonstrations (range ϭ 0 -10) and latency to success were not normally distributed (x ϭ median). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
located within 20 cm of the child. The experimenter held up the medal and said, "If you get this, you get a sticker, let's start you a pile," and a sticker was placed on the table. From here, the procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 1. Once the child was attending to the front, the experimenter said the child's name while simultaneously holding up the reward just above the center of the task. The experimenter then baited the task, putting the reward either in the proximal or distal location. Within 2 s, the experimenter operated either the pull-cord or lift-platform such that the platform swung up and the reward fell out onto the table, making it clear that the reward had been extracted. The child received 10 demonstrations. On demonstrations one, four, seven, and 10 the experimenter picked up a sticker and added it to the child's pile. These reward intervals were selected to sustain interest and to indicate that they could receive the reward, but a sticker was not given after each trial to keep the reward administration similar to the capuchins'. After the 10 demonstrations, the experimenter rebaited the task in the same way and said, "Now it's your turn." The session time of 3 min started. If children were successful they were given up to a further four trials if this fell within the 3 min. The children that were not successful were rewarded with a sticker every 1 min and two more stickers at the end of the session to keep in line with the procedure used with the capuchins. Thus, they received the same number of stickers as successful individuals. There was no second phase where the reward location was reversed.
Coding
A research assistant involved with the study and a second research assistant, blind to the study's aims, separately coded eye gaze in the same way as for the capuchins: (a) the left side of the box, where the means were located (means); (b) at the right side of the box, away from the means (non-means'); (c) away from the box (away); or (d) unsure of where attention was focused (unsure). If coders did not agree, it was coded as unsure. All other behaviors were coded by a research assistant who was blind to the aims of the study and included: (a) first touch, (b) success, (c) latency to success, and (d) means. These were defined in line with the capuchin study except latency to success was from when the reward was baited and the baiting door closed until the reward exited the box. Table 1 summarizes the participant allocation and main findings. The following sections provide details of statistical analyses of the main hypotheses.
Results
Attention Toward Means
The same stepwise multiple regressions as for the capuchin study were conducted to evaluate whether attending during demonstrations could be predicted by the location of the reward and the age of the child (Table 2 ). For attention toward means the only model accounting for significantly more variance than no predictors included both reward location and age (p Ͻ .001). For attention toward nonmeans the only model accounting for significantly more variance than no predictors included location (p Ͻ .001) and did not include age.
Effects of Reward Contiguity on Success
Overall, 135/180 individuals were successful in the 3 min; 68 children used pull-cord and 61 children used lift-platform, indicating no bias toward either method (Binomial two-tailed, p ϭ .59). Six used an alternative method of reaching their hand through the exit slot and tipping the platform from this angle (distal conditions: no-demonstration ϭ 2, pull-cord ϭ 2, lift-platform ϭ 1, and proximal conditions: lift-platform ϭ 1). A logistic regression analysis was conducted to evaluate whether success could be predicted by presence of demonstration, reward location, and participant age. A test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant (R 2 ϭ .49, 2 ϭ 72.3, p Ͻ .001; Table A , available as online supplemental material). Greater success was predicted by presence of a demonstration (p Ͻ .001), a proximal reward (p Ͻ .001), and increased age (p Ͻ .01).
Differences in latency to success were investigated, with unsuccessful children given a latency of 180 s (3 min). A stepwise multiple linear regression was conducted to evaluate whether reward location, demonstration (present or absent), and participant age were necessary to predict latency to success (Table B , available as online supplemental material). The model accounting for the most variance (39%) included all three variables. Shorter latency to success was predicted by presence of a demonstration (p Ͻ .001), a proximal reward (p Ͻ .001), and increased age (p Ͻ .001).
Effects of Reward Contiguity on Matching of Demonstrated Means
Of the 109/120 children that were successful following a demonstration, 98 (90%) of them copied the demonstrated means. A logistic regression analysis was conducted to evaluate whether copying of the demonstrated means could be predicted by reward location and participant age. For a complete analysis, this was run twice, with unsuccessful children either included (coded as having not copied the model) or excluded. When unsuccessful children were included, the model that accounted for significantly more variance than no predictors included both reward location (B ϭ 2.16, SE B ϭ 0.67, Exp(B) ϭ 8.70, p Ͻ .01) and age (B ϭ 0.06, SE B ϭ 0.03, Exp(B) ϭ 1.07, p Ͻ .05, R 2 ϭ .26, 2 ϭ 20.56, p Ͻ .001). When unsuccessful children were excluded, the only model accounting for significantly more variance than no predictors included only reward location (B ϭ 1.86, SE B ϭ 0.81, Exp(B) ϭ 6.42, p Ͻ .05, R 2 ϭ .15, 2 ϭ 8.26, p Ͻ .05).
Additional Analyses of Behavioral Details
The majority (79.5%) of the 166 of children who interacted with the task (excluding two participants where first touch was unclear) touched the means congruent location. A logistic regression analysis was conducted to evaluate whether means congruent first touch could be predicted by three factors: demonstration presence, reward location and participant age. A model excluding age, against a constant-only model, was statistically significant (R 2 ϭ .28, 2 ϭ 33.21, p Ͻ .001; Table A , available as online supplemental material). Means congruent first touch was predicted by presence of a demonstration (p Ͻ .001) and a proximal reward (p Ͻ .001).
Participants were allowed up to five trials in 3 min, and 129 children completed all five trials. The vast majority (95.4%) only used one means throughout all trials.
Comparison Between Children and Capuchins
Capuchins were significantly less likely to touch the means versus nonmeans side of the task than children (Fisher's exact test (FET) p Ͻ .001) and significantly more likely to touch the side of the task where the reward was located than children (FET p Ͻ .001; Figure 3) . For both species, demonstration attention and success was affected by reward location (Figure 4) . Irrespective of reward location, children were significantly more likely to copy the method demonstrated than capuchins (FET p Ͻ .001).
Discussion
The current study explicitly manipulated reward location, relative to the means of obtaining the reward, to test the hypothesis that spatial contiguity between a reward and the means of accessing that reward affects social learning. We found evidence that, in two very different species of primate, reward location had a significant impact upon visual attention toward demonstrations of means and task success. Reward location also affected copying of the demonstrated means although this effect was shaped by species and age. In the following sections, we discuss these results and their implications for our understanding of the importance of spatial contiguity in social learning, for behavioral convergences and divergences between children and capuchins, and developmental changes in children.
Convergent Behavioral Patterns
For both species, the location of the reward had a significant effect on individual's attention toward the task during social demonstration of the means. If the reward was located proximal to the means, the majority of participants attended to this direction during demonstration. Conversely, when the reward was located at the distal location to the means, there was reduced attention toward the demonstrations and increased attention toward the distal reward. We take this as the first evidence that the sight of a reward stimulus proves to be an overpowering and distracting stimulus during social demonstrations. The distal reward location reduced attention toward social information which likely impaired social learning.
For both species the location of the reward had a significant effect on levels of success. When the reward was proximal to the means, the majority of individuals were successful whereas fewer individuals were successful when the reward was distal to the means, although this difference was only significant for the children. The detrimental effect of a distal reward to means location was evident in the increased latency to success for both species. The relationship between measures of success and social learning are unclear because reward and means spatial contiguity was consistent in both the demonstration and test phases. As a consequence, the location of reward during the test phase, rather than during demonstration, could have driven such an effect. Indeed, that: (a) two capuchins with no social information solved the task quickly; (b) previously successful capuchins in the proximal condition often became slower when the reward moved to a distal location; and (c) reward location affected success for nodemonstration children, all suggest that reward location may be sufficient for influencing success. Thus, the current study supports results showing that spatial contiguity affects nonsocial associative learning in animals (Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Polidora & Fletcher, 1964; Wasserman & Miller, 1997) . However, differing success levels between children in the demonstration and nodemonstration conditions indicated that the reward location during demonstration did affect their success. To further assess the impact of reward location upon social learning we investigated copying of the specific demonstrated means, which we address in the next section.
Divergent Behavioral Patterns
Comparative studies of humans with other species can be problematic because divergent behavior may be because of the different methods used (Boesch, 2007) although, as Tomasello and Call (2008) argue, methodological differences sometimes represent functional equivalence more so than exact matching. We acknowledge both sides of this debate and avoided an explicit comparison of the two species. Hence, the species took part in two different experiments and statistical comparisons were largely within each species. However, we feel it is appropriate to comment upon some of the behavioral divergences preceded by an outline of the primary methodological differences concerning the reward, the species (mis)matching of the demonstrator, the presence of a primary caregiver, and the response time.
First, the reward differed as we wanted a high value reward for both species. Food preference tests indicated that a peanut was the highest value reward for the capuchins. We were not able to offer a peanut to the children because of potential allergies. Thus, a sticker was deemed an equivalent high value reward. However, a sticker did not reliably exit the apparatus so a gold plastic token was used. Second, the experimenter (demonstrator) for every experiment was a human; thus the children had an unknown conspecific demonstrator whereas the capuchins had a familiar nonconspecific demonstrator. A human was required to ensure appropriate demonstration control. Third, presence of a primary caregiver and fourth, maximum response time differences were a product of aiming for equivalence in terms of comfort. These capuchins are This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
used to isolating and participating in experiments for up to 15 min and those capuchins that were unsuccessful continued to interact with the task for the full 5 min. Conversely, the children were not used to isolating and participating in experiments, and we did not want to cause undue stress with extended response times. We found, as with previous work (e.g., Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013) , that 3 min allowed sufficient time for testing, and children that were unsuccessful often ceased interacting with the task in under 2 min. A significant behavioral divergence was in the copying of the demonstrated means. Children generally copied the specific means demonstrated although a distal reward location significantly reduced rates of copying. We take this as the first evidence that reward and means proximity during demonstrations affects social learning in young children. The evidence of such an effect with capuchins was far less clear. Capuchins in the proximal condition showed a means choice that was significantly different to chance whereas those in the distal condition did not. However, surprisingly and puzzlingly, the means choice of eight of the nine capuchins in the proximal condition was opposite to the means demonstrated. We tentatively suggest that capuchins in the proximal condition were attending to the means, but counter to our intentions, the demonstrator's actions made the alternative means more salient. In reviewing videos, we noted that in the pull-cord demonstration the demonstrator's hand partially masked the grasped knobble, whereas the platform rising and the entrance hole used for lift-platform remain clearly visible. Conversely, during the liftplatform demonstration the demonstrator's hand potentially masked the entrance hole of this method whereas the alternative means remained clearly visible. Therefore, the means opposite to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the one demonstrated may have been inadvertently more salient to the capuchins. A difference in species relevance for the two species may have affected the salience of the social demonstration (Boesch, 2007) . Human hands may mean fundamentally different things to a capuchin versus a human child, potentially explaining why the reversal effect occurred with the capuchins but not the children. Thus, the capuchins may have been replicating these movements of components of the box (object movement centered) rather than the actions of the demonstrator (model movement centered, Whiten et al., 2004) . A second behavioral divergence was that all but one of the capuchins' first touches corresponded to the location of the reward whereas children's first touches were far more likely to correspond to the location of the means. The difference in reward may have caused this species difference; the food may have been far more salient for the capuchins and appealing than the secondary reinforcer token for the children. However, previous research indicates that children are very motivated to obtain a token that leads to the primary reinforcer of a sticker (e.g., Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012) . Although a secondary reinforcer may be less appealing and thus affect attention and prepotent responses to reach for it, we did not see any evidence that children were less interested in attending to the apparatus or demonstrations. We believe that the current study is a case where the reward was different but the functional equivalence of the reward was equally salient (Tomasello & Call, 2008) . Another explanation of this first-touch divergence is that capuchins had less understanding of the task material than the children and tried to access the reward through the transparent plastic. However, these capuchins have vast experience of transparent plastic in their enclosure, their frequently used enrichment devices, and in previous apparatus. Alternatively, capuchins have less inhibitory control and so reacted to a prepotent response to reach for food, as is species typical of capuchins (Amici et al., 2008; Beran et al., 2016) . The current study cannot confidently distinguish between these explanations but they are ripe for further exploration.
The third notable species difference relates to solution conservatism. Although the majority of the capuchins used both means, children generally showed high levels of conservatism toward one means. Solution conservatism versus flexibility has been investigated in several other primate species (e.g., chimpanzees : Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth, & Brosnan, 2011; vervet monkeys: van de Waal, Borgeaud, and Whiten (2013) ; and squirrel monkeys: Claidière, Messer, Hoppitt, & Whiten, 2013 ) and the current study shows that brown capuchin monkeys are able to flexibly switch between different means. Conversely, only six children used multiple methods in line with other research demonstrating high method conservatism in children following social demonstrations (Hopper et al., 2010) . However, the level of conservatism in the no-demonstration conditions is surprising given that previous work with 5-year-olds has shown that personal exploration may encourage multiple-method adoption (Wood et al., 2013 ). An age difference may explain these differences. The results suggest that social information was not the reason for means conservatism in the current study and therefore cannot explain why children were markedly more conservative than capuchins.
Developmental Changes
The age of a child was a significant predictor of: attention toward means and nonmeans sides of the task; success; and copying of the demonstrated means (when including unsuccessful children). Although 4-year-olds were somewhat distracted by the reward during the demonstration phase, they were still able to attend to social information sufficiently to be successful relatively quickly and to copy the demonstrated means. Conversely, younger children were distracted by the reward, were less successful, and showed less reproduction of the demonstrated means. Previous demonstrations by a human conspecific using a transparent apparatus have not shown many development differences in the copying of the means between ages two-to 5-years-old (Flynn, 2008; Flynn & Whiten, 2008a , 2008b Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan et al., 2007; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009 ). However, several of these studies that used the same apparatuses have revealed developmental differences in some behavioral responses. For example, McGuigan et al. (2007) found that 3-year-olds were less likely to copy the demonstrated means than 5-year-olds when the demonstration was via a video. The authors argue that for the younger children "the degraded information led to a differential focus on the task outcome, as opposed to the actions of the model, resulting in an emulative approach." (p. 362). The current study suggests that differences in the presentation of the means, as with the capuchins, can affect younger children's attention more than older children's. This in turn leads older children to copy the form of an action (model movement centered), and younger children to copy the form of a caused object movement (object movement centered).
Likewise, McGuigan and Whiten (2009) compared their results with two-and 3-year-olds with that of McGuigan et al.'s (2007) study and found that in relation to copying of causally irrelevant tool insertions within the means, age increase corresponded to an increase in copying unnecessary demonstrated tool insertions and insertion method. This difference was greatest when the reward was in an opaque chute held in a transparent versus opaque apparatus. The authors suggest that the younger children may have "focused their attention differently from the older children, with the 3-and 5-year-olds focusing their attention on the actions of the model and the majority of the younger children focusing either on the results of the task or on reproducing the movements of parts of the box" (p. 379). We suggest that, irrespective of box transparency, 5-year-old children focus their attention on both the actions of the model and the movement of parts affected. Conversely, and particularly when an apparatus is transparent and the reward's location is salient, younger children are distracted by the reward and so attend less to the model's actions. We speculate that this may be a likely explanation for the developmental change toward inefficient copying, rather than any developmental changes relating to strategies concerning what to copy.
A similar explanation could apply to an increase in chimpanzee's copying of causally irrelevant tool insertions when the apparatus involved was opaque rather than transparent (Horner & Whiten, 2005) . Chimpanzees presented with the transparent apparatus may have been distracted by the reward location and thus primarily attended to demonstrated actions in the area proximal to the reward, which they copied, while ignoring demonstrated actions distal to the reward which they failed to copy. We believe This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
further investigation of this area is important in our understanding of the phenomena of inefficient copying thus far documented in older children and adults but not in younger children and other species.
Implications for Social Learning Research
The current study has been the first to demonstrate significant effects of reward location on attention toward, and social learning from, demonstrations by others. It has highlighted how a small change in experimental and apparatus design can have a marked impact on behavioral responses associated with social learning. As noted in our introduction, capuchin social learning has appeared most evident and sophisticated when a single reward was protected by an opaque defense and where the action upon that defense was proximal to the reward. The results from the current study offer an explanation of why this might occur. Apparent differences in evidence for social learning in multiple experiments with capuchins may instead reflect differences in spatial contiguity between reward and means. The same may also be true of apparent species differences where different apparatuses have been used. We would urge future work with all species to consider that seemingly minor changes in apparatus design can have a marked impact and that tasks that are opaque-the common occurrence in the wild-may offer the greatest chance of demonstrating an animal's social learning abilities.
The current study may aid an understanding of social learning differences between species and across development insofar as demonstrating that capuchins and 2-year-old children are more easily distracted away from social information by a reward than 4-year-old children. We are not claiming this is the only explanation for species and developmental differences in social learning, but such effects contribute to a greater understanding of social learning and the distinctiveness of humans' social learning abilities. From as young as 4-years-old, children are able to attend to socially demonstrated solutions and reproduce these solutions with high fidelity (here and McGuigan et al., 2007) . Such high fidelity transmission of behavioral traits between individuals has been proposed to be of key importance to the evolution of cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Tomasello, 1999) . Research that cannot only describe but explain differences in copying behaviors may help to unlock the key to humankind's success.
